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L Introduction
A salient feature of the service industry is that, in general, it is very difficult to measure its output. While input data mostly are available, it is commonly the case that reliable output quantity or output price data cannot be found in official statistical sources. Indeed, for some types of services, notably within the public sector, it is not even possible to obtain output value measures. The purpose of an earlier paper [Mellander and Ysander (1990)] was to examine what conclusions that can be drawn about the production technology and the producer behavior in the latter situation, i.e. when there is no output information whatsoever. It was shown that for homothetic production technologies -Le. technologies which have the propert y that the optimal factor mix is independent of the level of productiontime series on input prices and input quantities only can be used to studyalmost all dimensions of the production process by means of a dual approach, using the cost function as the instrument of analysis. In principle, the only aspects that cannot be investigated are those affecting input demands neutrally, e.g. (purely) Hicks-neutral technical change and properties relating to returns to scale. 1 This paper extends the analysis to the case when a measure of the value of output is available, which is the typical situation for most kinds of private services.
Thus, the analysis will again be based on the cost function and it will presume that firms are endowed with homothetic production technologies and operate on a competitive input market. The output market, on the other hand, will be allowed, to be non competitive. It will be assumed, however, that in the context of mark up pricing the mark up is either known or (approximately) constant. Thus, while there can be a wedge between the marginal cost and the output price it is assumed that if this wedge is unknown it can be treated parametrically. Finally, to -2-simplify the analysis, the producer is assumed to maximize profits and attention is confined to static equilibrium modeis.
The homotheticity assumption and the requirement that, in the absence of a priori information, the possible markup be constant might perhaps seem rat her restrictive. It should be noticed, however, that if one instead follows the traditional route in dealing with the output measurement problem and replaces the unknown output by sorne proxy variable(s) then it is usually impossible to say anything about under which circumstances the variations in· the proxy (-ies) really rnirror the ch anges in the actual output, and so one can never be sure whether the results obtained are valid. Here, it is completely clear under which conditions the method suggested is applicable.
Concerning the homothet ici t y assumption it can be argued that it is more easily justified in the context of service production than in goods production. Due to the more limited scope for automatization in the service industry, expansion of ten takes place by the setting up of additional production units (offices), similar to the ones already existing. Examples can be found within the banking industry and in travel agencies, for instance. As a result, the input proportions change much less than when the expansion occurs mainly through additions to the capital stock, as is the case in the manufacturing industry.2 Regarding the constant rnarkup assumption it should be noticed that in the context of productivity measurement it is quite common to assume not only the input but also the output market to be competitive.
Here, the latter assumption is relaxed, albeit in a crude way.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section II starts with a description of the model in terms of the firms' production technologies and the market conditions. The existence of an equilibriurn in the output market is then established and sufficient 2 Of course, input proportions ch ange over time in the service industry, too, because of ch anges in relative factor prices. The claim here is simply that the small er ch anges observed for the service industry as compared to the manufacturing industry are due to the fact that ceteris paribus expansion affects input proportions much less in the service industry than in the manufacturing industry.
eonditions for a unique and stable equilibrium are eonsidered. Finally, the key result of the paper is derived, namelyarelation between the unknown output variable and the ratio of the value of output over total eosts, for whieh data are assumed to be available. In Section III a decomposition of total faetor produetivity growth into the effeets of (Hieks-)neutral technical ehange, biased teehnieal ehange, and effeets from returns to scale is considered, followed by a general diseussion of the estimation of eaeh of these eomponents. Seetion IV demonstrates how the theoretieal results can be implemented by means öf partieular flexible funetional form, namely the translog eost funetion. Concluding comments are given in Seetion V.
II. The model
The basic strueture of the model is given by the following three sets of assumptions.
(i) Technological assumptions
Firms, indexed by i = l, ... ,m where m might be equal to 1, are assumed produee the (homogeneous) output good by means of (possibly different) homothetie teehnologies. Given eost minimization [ef. (iii) below] the firm's teehnology can be eharaeterized by means of the eost funetion whieh. Due to the homothetieity assumption, the eost funetion is separable in output, Vi' and the vector w of input priees, aeeording to
where the time index t represents the state of the teehnology and C. (l,w,t) l denotes the eost of producing one unit of output. Coneerning notation, C i will only be used to denote total eosts, to avoid eonfusion between total and unit eost.
Further, boldfaee types will be used to denote vectors (small letters) and matriees (capitals). Aeeordingly, it is assumed here that output can be treated as a scalar.
This does not exc1ude multiple output activities but it requires the existenee of an output aggregate. 3 The funetion Ii (yJ, which is monotonically inereasing, determines the scaling properties of the teehnology. 4 In this and the following section C. will be l assumed to be a regular eost funetion. 5 In addition, it will be taken to be twice differentiable with respect to each of its arguments.
It is further assumed that the elasticity of total eosts with respeet to output (2) is monotonically increasing in output, i.e.,
While the cost/output elasticity very of ten is assumed to be non-decreasing, it is less of ten assumed to be strictly increasing since this rules out homogeneous technologies and hence, in particular, technologies that are homogeneous of degree 1, Le. exhibit constant returns to scale. 6 The reason for the strict monotonicity assumption is that in the discussion below the existence of a mapping from the cost/output elasticity to the level of output will be exploited; such a mapping exists if, and only if, the function ci( Vi) can be inverted, Le. if it is strictly monotonic. 7 Finally, it is assumed that marginal eosts are strictly inereasing, Le. 
(iii) Assumptions about information sets and behavior
All firms are assumed to know the inverse industry market demand eurve, their own eost function, and the eost funetions of all other firms. Given this information they seek to maximize profits. o
The assumption that production technologies are homothetic implies that the profit maximization problem of firm i can be divided into two separate subproblems.
The first problem is to ehoose the cost-minimizing factor proportions, which are independent of the scale of produetion. The second problem is to choose the optimal level of output. 9 The solution to the first problem is given by C. (l,w,t) . When l solving the second problem the firm can take C. (l,w,t) as given. Accordingly, l firm ils maximization problem can be written too. It means, however, that for these teehnologies the output value measure yields no extra information in addition to that provided by the input data.
s Of course, the argument list of the priee function will in general include a number of exogenous shift variables. To simplify the notation, these are suppressed here.
It should be noticed assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that the profit funetion 1ri is strictly concave with respect to Yi.1 0
Following Appelbaum (1982) , the first order eonditions for profit maximization can be formulated aeeording to
where (6) is the eonjeetural elasticity of total industry output with respeet to the output of firm i and 1] is the inverse demand elasticity, defined as (7) Aeeording to (6), the firm should set its output sueh that its marginal eost equal its perceived marginal revenue. This formulation of the first order eondition is eonsistent with a wide range of behavioral modes. E.g., under Cournot behavior the eonjeetural variation equals one implying that the conjeetural elasticity Di reduees to the output share of firm i. In the ease of perfeet eompetition Oj = O for all i. Further, under pure monopolyand in the ease of eollusive behavior the eonjectural elasticity will be identieally equal to one, in the former ease because Yl = Ity and in the latter beeause (öIty/öy.) = Ity/y. for l l all i. Although other types of behavior are also eoneeivable within this framework only the four types just mentioned will be eonsidered here.
Coneerning the Cournot oligopoly game the analysis in Friedman (1986, pp. lOThe strict eoncavity of total industry revenue with respeet to total output implies that p(Ity). Yi is strietly eoneave with respeet to Yi. Further, (4) implies that the eost funetion is strietly eonvex with respeet to Yi or, equivalently that the negative of the eost funetion is strietly eoneave with respeet to Yi. Aeeordingly, 7fi is a sum of two strietly eoneave funetions and so must itself be strietly eoneave.
7-54 -56) demonstrates the existence of at least one equilibrium point. 11 Since pure competition can be viewed as a limiting case of the Cournot oligopoly it follows that there must be at least one pure competition equilibrium, too. In the context of pure monopoly the existence of equilibrium is trivial. To the extent that the case of collusive behavior can be treated like a multi -plant monopolyoperation, Le. if agreements can really be considered binding, it is clear that there must exist an equilibrium in that case, too.
In the Appendix conditions for the equilibrium to be unique and stable are considered for the the simple case when the inverse demand curve is linear. ( An equilibrium relation will now be derived between the output level Yiwhich is presumed to be unknown to the econometrician -and total eosts C i and the value of output Vi == p' Yi' for which data are assumed to be available. The first step is to solve (5) for p, yielding
11 Taken together, assumptions (i) -(iii) fulfill Conditions 2.1 -2.3 in Friedman, with one minor qualifieation: whereas in Friedman both the inverse demand function and the cost functions are defined over the range [O, (0) the eorresponding range is here assumed to be [8, (0) where 8 is some (infinitely) small positive number. The reason for this differenee is that the dual eost funetion is weIl defined only for strictly positive output leveis, cf. Diewert (1971, p. 489) . It should also be said that since the intention is to use this model for measuring productivity developments one has to think of the Cournot one -shot game as being repeated over time. This is the key result of the paper; the next two sections will discuss how it can be used in the estimation of total factor productivity growth. 13 III. On the estimation of total factor productivity growth
In this and the following section the data available to the econometrician will be assumed to refer either to a single firm or to an aggregat e of firms.1 4 Accordingly, the firm index i will be dropped in the following.
The following (time series) information is assumed to exist. All relevant input data are known, Le. both the quantities used of the n factors of production,
and the corresponding input prices UJ= (wF .. ,w n ), and, consequently, total costs C= w l x. Regarding the output side, only the value V (= p' y) of output is assumed to be known.
The following duality result, due to Ohta (1975) , provides a useful decomposition of the growth in total factor productivity (TFP). Denote the production function corresponding to C(y,w,t) by 'ljJ(x,t) . The rate of change in TFP can then be written
where (12) and E-l is the invers e of the elasticity of total costs with respect to output, defined in (2). The factor V is the dual rate of technical change. Thus, if technical change 13 I was surprised to find that the interesting relation (9) seems to have gone almost unnoticed. However, in a different context Morrison (1992, p. 55) , considers the corresponding result in the monopoly case, Le. when fl, = (1 -T/)-1 .
14 For the lat ter case to be meaningful the existence of a representative firm has to be assumed. As a discussion of aggregation conditions is outside the scope of this paper, suffice it to note that the assumption that all the m firms are identical is (trivially) sufficient for the existence of a representative firm.
has a positive impaet v measures the resulting rate of diminution in total eosts.
The inverse of the eost/output elasticity is the dual rate of return to scale. Returns to seale are inereasing if c-l> 1, constant if c-l = 1, and deereasing if c-l < 1.
The dual rate of teehnieal ehange ean be further decomposed into two eomponents eorresponding to (Hieks-)neutral technieal ehange and non -neutral, Le. input specifie, teehnical ehange. The former is a funetion of t while the lat ter depends on both t and w. Thus, denoting these funetions by g and h,
The problem of estimating the three components in TFP growth will now be examined in some detail. The estimation of the dual rate of return to seale, whieh does not require any assumptions about the funetional form of the eost funetion, is diseussed first. Coneerning the two eomponents relating to teehnical ehange, the one eorresponding to non-neutral, i.e. input s pecifie , teehnical ch anges will be very briefly eonsidered, as its estimation is diseussed in Mellander and Ysander (op. eit.) .
Finally, the direet relation between the presumed output measurement problem and the estimation of (Hicks-)neutral technical ehange will examined.
The dual rate o f return to scale
Since the dual rate of return to scale is simply the inverse of the eost/output elasticity (IO) yields
showing that the eos t value ratio is proportional to the dual rate of return to seale.
Aceordingly, if the markup K, is known the dual rate of return to scale can be eomputed directly by means of the given data ontotaleosts and the valueofoutput.
However, if I\; is not known a priori it is clear that the dual rate of returns to seale effeet on total faetor productivity can only be measured conditionaI upon this unknown constant. That is to say, it will be necessary to perform some kind of -11-sensitivity analysis where the consequences of different assumptions about the magnitude of K, are investigated.
The dual rate of non-neutral technical change
Estimation of the last term in (12'), Le. -afnh (w, t)j at, merely requires input data and the specification of an explicit functional form for the function h (w, t). According to Shephard's lemma
where Sj is the cost share of input j, i.e. Sj == (wjX j / C). Thus, the homotheticity assumption makes the cost shares functions of w and tonly.
Imposing linear homogeneity of h(w,t) in w, one can obtain an estimate of h (w, t) by simultaneous estimation of n-1 of the n share equations.1 5 P artial differentiation of this estimate with respect to t then yields an estimate of
aCnh (w, t)/ at .1 6
Before turning to the estimation of the dual rate of Hicks -neutral technical change it should be said that while the above discussion has shown that the minimal requirements for the estimation of -aCnh (w, t) / a t are very limited, the efficiency of the parameter estimates might be substantially increased if the cost function is estimated together with the system of cost sharesP Hence, the necessity to specify the eos t funetion eompletely to enable estimation of the Hieks -neutral eomponent in TFP growth, to be diseussed next, has the positive side -effeet of inereasing the precision in the estimate of the funetion h (w, t) ,18
The dual rate o f neutral technical change
As the input eost shares are unaffeeted by neutral teehnieal ehange estimation of the funetion g (t) requires specification and estimation of the eomplete eost funetion. But estimation of the east funetion presupposes data on y -or at least data providing information about the variation in y. This is the reason for assumption (3) whieh, through (9), aseertains that y can be expressed in terms of v, C, and fl,.
One possibility is to assume that € is linear in y, Le.
where the positivity eanstraint follows from (3). By (10),
The speeifieation (15) thus results in y beeoming an affine transformation of the VI C -ratio. One can go one step further, however, by exploiting the faet that for empirical implementations it is the variation in y (rather than its level) that is of interest. The reason is that the explicit eost funetions used in empirical applieations eonstitute first or second order approximations to the "true" eost funetion around some point of expansion. Aeeordingly, what matters are the variations around the expansion point, whieh means that y (as weIl as the w. 's J and t) are appropriately measured in terms of deviations from this point. The
18 Moreover, consideration of the whole eost funetion in the estimation a1so makes it possible to test the validity of the restrietion that h (w, t) be linearly homogeneous in w. This is not possible if only the system of eost shares is estimated, since in that ease the homogeneity restrietion has to be imposed a priori (ef. above) to aseertain that the parameters to be estimated are identified .. 19 This type of specification has been diseussed by Zellner and Revankar (1969) .
The eorresponding sealing funetion is given by f (yJ = yfLexp( cp' y) . 
where (VI ej denotes the value/cost -ratio corresponding to the expansion point, Of course, there are other specifications of c: which also have the propert y that E is monotonically increasing in y. E.g., in studies based on the translog function proposed by Christensen et al. (1973) the following formulation is the most common one
Subjecting (17) to the same operations as those performed on (15') to obtain (16) one gets
This is the specification that will be used in the next section. As a matter of matter -14-of interpretation, note that by taking y to be the value of y in a base-year the o left hand side of (18) becomes (the logarithm of) a quantity index for output.
IV. Implementation by means of the translog cost function
Since it is desirable to impose few a priori restrictions on the substitution possibilities among the factors of production, one should preferably consider flexible functional forms in the specifieation of an explicit funetional form for the general eost funetion (1). The reason why the translog has been chosen here is that it is eonvenient to work and has been shown to provide adequate estimates of quite complex teehnologies [ef. Guilkey and Lovell (1980) ]. It should be stressed, however, that, in principle, the above results can be implemented by means of any eost funetion whieh fulfills the assumptions in Section II.
The translog cost funetion eonstitutes a second order approximation to mC(y,w,t) in terms of lny, mw1, ... ,mw n , and t. Denote the point around which the "true" eost funetion is expanded by (my, mW 1 
where Direet applieation of the last result in the previous seetion yields
where
q:=. (VI e) -(VI e) .
_ o
By means of (24) the eost funetion can be formulated in terms of V l e, w, and t, rat her than y, w, and t, according to 
From (28) and (29) it is clear that for a given K both a and l' are identified.
y yy
To ensure that the eost/output elasticity implied by the model, i.e. 
20 If the markup is known, the argument ql fl, is substituted for q in the eost funetion, the parameters aq and 1'qq becoming ay/1'yy and I/1'yy, respectively.
is consistent with (9) and that the propert y (3) holds the following constraints must be imposed on a and Io < a .
Together, (28), (29), (31), and (32) yield
By inserting the expressions for fny, a , and I given by (24), (33) and (34) moreover, it will make it possible to form some idea about the precision in the estimate of the scale elasticity, through the standard error of the parameter a of q which l' is a function. Finally, it should be remembered that it is only by using yy q as an instrument for lny that one can estimate the function g (t j . As in the case when output data are available these restrictions can all be tested.
Application of (12) - (12') to (21) and (22) gives the effect of technical change on the TFP growth rate according to
where the first and second terms correspond to effects from neutral and non-neutral technical change, respectively. Further, by combining (11), (13) and (35) A -1
Since TFP is dependent on fl, it will be necessary to perform a sensitivity analysis on TFP with respect to this parameter, uniess it is known a priori.
Finally, it should be noted that in addition to the productivity measures the empirical analysis also yields estimates of (the logarithms of) the output quantity and output price indices. (Of course, like the estimates of TFP growth these estimates will be conditionai on the markup factor K.) By means of the definition (23a) and the results (24) and (34), the log of the output quantity index can be estimated according to (37) Further, the definition
implies that the log of the output price index can be estimated as
Since for many service industries proper output quantity and output price indices are not available in the national accounts statistics, (37) and (38) 
v. Concluding comments
The problem considered in this paper concerns the possibilities to to empirically charaeterize a production process when there is complete input information but the output information is limited to data on the gross value of output, a situation typical of a large part of the private service sector. It is demonstrated that if (i) the teehnology is homothetic, if (ii) output can be treated as a scalar, and if (iii) the elasticity of total eost with respect output is strictly increasing in output, then, essentially, the only additional information required for a eomplete charaeterization of the produetion proeess is the possible difference (in percentage terms) between the marginal eost and the output price, Le. the potential markup.
Since in many cases it is difficult to obtain information about the markup the analysis proceeds to the case when the priee elastieity is unknown but constant. It is shown that in this case the results eontinue to hold, conditionai on the unknown markup faetor.
The key assumption is (iii); it is this assumption that makes it possible to substitute known variables for the unknown output variable in the cost function.
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The fact that (iii) is not onIy sufficient to enabIe this substitution but als o necessary has an important impIication, nameIy that a value measure of output carries information in excess to that inherent in input data onIy if the underlying technology is not homogeneous. Thus, that the technology exhibits non -constant returns to scaIe is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Concerning productivity measurement, the result is that if the markup is known the rate of growth in total factor productivity can be estimated with the same precision as if output data were available. If the mark up is unknown, the estimated rate of growth in TFP will be conditionai upon the assumption made about the markup and so, in applications, it will be necessary to perform a sensitivity analysis where the effect of variations in the markup is assessed. This is, however, very easy to do; as long as different constant markups are considered the model does not have to reestimated when the markup is altered. Moreover, in quite a few empirical applications it should be possible to obtain information at least about the magnitude of the markup, indicating the interval over which the sensitivity analysis should be carried out.
Appendix: Conditions for uniqueness and stability of equilibrium Since the profit functions are assumed to be twice differentiable with respect the Yj'S, Theorem 2.6 in Friedman (1986, p. 45) can be used to formulate conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. According to this theorem, the equilibrium is unique if the symmetric m x m matrix
is negative definite, where P is the Jacobian matrix of the system of first order derivatives of the profit functions, Le. 
where f = (Ha -Hg) / Hg. It can easily be verified that if f ~ 0.5, which seems like a very reasonable assumption, then the RRS of (A3) will be non -positive for all A such that -2· B g ~ A « O). (For higher val ues on f the lower bound will be eloser to zero.) Thus, for the case when m = 3 it should be possible to conclude that the equilibrium is unique if the inverse industry market demand curve is linear and (the absolute value of) its slope is less than twice the geometric mean of the slopes of the firm's marginal cost curves.
-21-Stability eonditions can be found in Friedman (1977, p. 71) . Aeeording to these, the equilibrium is stable if Le. for m = 2 the slope of the marginal eost eurve should exeeed the absolute value of the slope of the demand eurve for eaeh firm. If m = 3 the slopes of the marginal cost eurves must be more than twiee the absolute value of the slope of the demand eurve.
These conditions are considerably stronger than those required for uniqueness and fulfillment of them implies fulfillment of the uniqueness conditions.
